this, that if the two houses should give up to the King, any, the most essential rights of the people declared in Magna Charta, the nation has not a power either de jura or de facto to prevent it. I may hereafter quote for his serious perusal, the reasoning of the immortal Locke upon this important subject, and am, in the mean time, Your's, CANDIDUS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS TO THE GOVERNOR, APRIL 10, 1772. [Massachusetts State Papers, pp. 315, 316; a draft, is in the Samuel Adams Papers, Lenox Library.] May it please your Excellency. The House of Representatives have duly considered your speech1 to both Houses, at the opening of this session. Your Excellency is pleased to acquaint us, that, "if we had desired you to carry the Court to Boston, because it is the most convenient place; and the prerogative of the Crown to instruct the Governor to convene the Court at such place as his Majesty may think proper, had not been denied; you should have obtained leave to meet us in Boston, at this time; but that you shall not be at liberty to do so, whilst this denial is persisted in." We have maturely considered this point; and are still firmly in opinion, that such instruction is repugnant to the royal charter, wherein the Governor is vested with the full power of adjournment, proroguing and dissolving the General Assembly, as he shall judge necessary. Nothing in the charter, appears to us to afford the least grounds to conclude, that a right is reserved to his Majesty of controling the Governor, in thus exercising this full power. Nor indeed does it seem reasonable that there should for, it being impossible that any one, at the distance of three thousand miles, should be able to foresee the most convenient time or place of holding the Assembly, it is necessary that such discretionary power should be lodged with the Governor, who is, by Charter, constantly to reside within the Province. We are still earnestly desirous of the removal of this Assembly to the Court House, in Boston; and we are sorry that your Excellency's determination thereon, depends upon our disavowing these principles; because we cannot do it consistently with the duty we owe our constituents. We are constrained to be explicit at this time; for if we should be silent, after your Excellency has recommended it to us, as a necessary preliminary, to desist from saying any thing upon this head, while we request your Excellency for a removal of the Assembly, for reasons of convenience only, it might be construed as tacitly conceding to a doctrine injurious to the constitution, and in effect, as rescinding our own record, of which we still deliberately approve.