Congress has been long embarrassed by two of the most irritating questions that ever can be raised among them: 1, the funding the public debt, and 2, the fixing on a more central residence. After exhausting their arguments and patience on these subjects, they have for some time been resting on their oars, unable to get along as to these businesses, and indisposed to attend to anything else, till they are settled. And in fine, it has become probable, that unless they can be reconciled by some plan of compromise, there will be no funding bill agreed to. Our credit (raised by late prospects to be the first on the exchange at Amsterdam, where our paper is above par) will burst and vanish, and the States separate, to take care every one of itself. This prospect appears probable to some well-informed and well-disposed minds. Endeavors are, therefore, using to bring about a disposition to some mutual sacrifices. The assumption of State debts has appeared as revolting to several States as their non-assumption to others. It is proposed to strip the proposition of the injustice it would have done by leaving the States who have redeemed much of their debts on no better footing than those who have redeemed none; on the contrary, it is recommended to assume a fixed sum, allotting a portion of it to every State in proportion to its census. Consequently, every State will receive exactly what they will have to pay, or they will be exonerated so far by the general government's taking their creditors off their hands. There will be no injustice then. But there will be the objection still, that Congress must then lay taxes for those debts which would have been much better laid and collected by the State governments. And this is the objection on which the accommodation now hangs with the non-assumptioners, many of whom committed themselves in their advocation of the new Constitution, by arguments drawn from the improbability that Congress would ever lay taxes where the States could do it separately. These gentlemen feel the reproaches which will be levelled at them personally. I have been, and still am of their opinion, that Congress should always prefer letting the States raise money in their own way, where it can be done. But in the present instance, I see the necessity of yielding to the cries of the creditors in certain parts of the Union; for the sake of union, and to save us from the greatest of all calamities, the total extinction of our credit in Europe. On the other hand, it is proposed to pass an act fixing the temporary residence of twelve or fifteen years at Philadelphia, and that at the end of that time, it shall stand _ipso facto_, and without further declaration transferred to Georgetown. In this way, there will be something to displease and something to soothe every part of the Union but New York, which must be contented with what she has had. If this plan of compromise does not take place, I fear one