But I see no such opposition between these two instruments. The Cherokees were entitled to the sole occupation of the lands within the limits guaranteed to them. The State of North Carolina, according to the _jus gentium_ established for America by universal usage, had only a right of pre-emption of these lands against all other nations. It could convey, then, to its citizens only this right of pre-emption, and the right of occupation could not be united to it till obtained by the United States from the Cherokees. The act of cession of North Carolina only preserves the rights of its citizens in the same state as they would have been, _had that act never been passed_. It does not make imperfect titles perfect; but only prevents their being made worse. Congress, by their act, accept on these conditions. The claimants of North Carolina, then, and also the Cherokees, are exactly where they would have been, had neither the act of cession, nor that of acceptance, been ever made; that is, the latter possess the right of occupation, and the former the right of pre-emption. Though these deductions seem clear enough, yet the question would be a disagreeable one between the general government, a particular government, and individuals, and it would seem very desirable to draw all the claims of pre-emption within a certain limit, by commuting for those out of it, and then to purchase of the Cherokees the right of occupation. I have the honor to be, my dear Sir, yours respectfully and affectionately. TO M. LA FOREST, _Consul of France_. New York, August 30, 1790.