Theism and Humanism: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914Balfour, Arthur James
Religion
Theism and Humanism: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914
Balfour, Arthur James
Humanism; Naturalism; Theism
I have no sympathy with the singular combination of intellectual
arrogance and intellectual timidity so often presented by this
particular school of thought. I like it no better than I like the
attitude of those who declare that, since reason is bankrupt, authority
should take over its liabilities, however small be the prospect of
discharging them in full. My point of view is utterly different. And if
I urge that the criticism of common knowledge brings us ultimately to
Theism, this involves no intolerable paradox, nor indeed anything very
new or strange.
Descartes, for example, thought that all knowledge was based on clear
and distinct ideas, and that clear and distinct ideas could be trusted
because, being due to God, they were guaranteed by His truthfulness.
That there is a God possessing every perfection was independently
established by an _a priori_ argument into which I need not enter. But
the point of interest is that, though Descartes conceived himself to
have found a refuge from scepticism in the famous “I think, therefore I
am,” he could only get from this narrow assurance to general knowledge
by the use of “clear and distinct ideas” certified by divine veracity.
If, therefore, belief in one’s self was the first of truths, belief in
God was the second; and on this second truth all subordinate beliefs,
mathematical, physical, and metaphysical, were, in his opinion,
ultimately founded. In one sense, and from one point of view, this
is no doubt an exact inversion of the argument developed in these
lectures. Descartes rests the belief in science on a belief in God. I
rest the belief in God on a belief in science. Nevertheless, beneath
this contrast there is deep-lying agreement. Both views reject the
notion that we possess in the general body of common-sense assumptions
and scientific truths a creed self-sufficing and independent, to
which we may add at our pleasure Theism in such doses as suit our
intellectual palate. Both views, therefore, are profoundly divided, not
merely from all that calls itself agnostic, but from much that calls
itself religious.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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