Theism and Humanism: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914Balfour, Arthur James
Religion
Theism and Humanism: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Glasgow, 1914
Balfour, Arthur James
Humanism; Naturalism; Theism
The best imitation of creative purpose, therefore, which Naturalism can
provide breaks down where it is most required—namely, at the highest
levels of value. I have just shown this in connection with our powers
of thought, and the beliefs to which they lead. But the failure is not
confined to them. It is as wide as Humanism itself. Wherever we find
great intrinsic worth, there we are in a region where the direct effect
of selection is negligible. The noblest things in speculation, in art,
in morals, possess small survival value; and, though the geniuses to
whom we owe them have added greatly to the glory of their race, they
have added but little to its animal successes. In the language of these
lectures, they are “accidental”—due neither to purpose nor to any
arrangement of causes by which purpose is successfully copied.
III
You are now in a position to judge how far the hopes held out to you at
the beginning of this course have been fulfilled, and to measure the
merits and the demerits, the claims and the limitations, of the scheme
I have endeavoured to expound.
I disowned, as you remember, any intention of providing you with a
philosophical system—not because I despise philosophical systems or
those who labour to construct them, but in part because I have none to
recommend, and in part because it seems to me doubtful whether at our
present stage of development a satisfactory system is possible.
But how (you may ask) does my point of view differ from a philosophical
system? It may be a bad system, as it certainly is a most imperfect
one. Yet, seeing that it touches on everything in heaven and earth,
seeing that its very title embraces God and man, why should it
repudiate a description which seemingly is not a whit in excess of its
pretensions?
The question thus raised is more than a merely verbal one, and a few
observations upon it may fittingly conclude the course. Note, then,
in the first place, that my scheme of beliefs does not show itself
unworthy to be considered systematic merely because it is incomplete.
All systems are incomplete. All systems, however ambitious, admit
their inability to exhaust reality. Nor is its unworthiness due to any
mere accident of execution, such as inferior workmanship or defective
learning. Its failures are essential and irremediable. They are
inseparable from “the point of view.”
Let me explain. Every system that deserves to be described as a
constructive philosophy—be it dogmatic, critical, empirical, idealist,
what you will—conceives itself not merely to be rooted in reason, but
to be rationalised throughout. The conceptions with which it works
should be sifted, clarified, defined. It should assume nothing which
requires proof. It should rest nothing (in the last resort) on faith or
probability. It should admit no inexplicable residues.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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