Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876Flint, Robert
Religion
Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876
Flint, Robert
Theism
that case any moral conflicts in the human heart akin to those which
a Sophocles or a Shakespeare has delineated? Were there no God, there
ought to be no fear of God awakened even by crime; but atheism itself
cannot protect a criminal when alive to his guilt from being haunted
and appalled by fears of a judgment and a justice more terrible than
those of man. When we are perfectly willing to bear any pain which the
mere laws of nature attach to our sins, and when our reason assures us
that we have nothing to fear on account of them from the law or even
the opinion of society, why, if our moral natures are not seared and
deadened, do we yet fear, and fear most when most alone? "Inanimate
things," says Dr Newman, "cannot stir our affections; these are
correlative with persons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility,
are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience,
this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom
we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong,
we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us
on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same seeming
serenity of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows
on one receiving praise from a father,--we certainly have within us
the image of some person to whom our love and veneration look, in
whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we
direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away.
These feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an
intelligent being; we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we
feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction
in breaking mere human law: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these
painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and, on
the other hand, it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a
resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object
to elicit. 'The wicked flees, when no one pursueth;' then why does
he flee? Whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in
darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these
emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his
perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the
phenomena of conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination
with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful,
all-seeing, retributive."[38]
[38] Grammar of Assent, pp. 106, 107.
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