Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876Flint, Robert
Religion
Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876
Flint, Robert
Theism
Comte, following Laplace, has argued that there is no evidence of
intelligence or design in the solar system, because its elements and
members are not disposed in the most advantageous manner. The moon, in
particular, we are assured, should have been so placed that it would
revolve round the earth in the same time that the earth revolved round
the sun. In that case she would appear every night, and always at the
full. Storms, volcanoes, earthquakes, and deserts have been often
argued to be defects which mar both the beauty and utility of creation.
Changes in the polar regions, in the physical character of Africa, in
the position of the Asiatic continent, and in the Pacific Ocean, have
been suggested as improvements on the constitution of the world. The
actual climates of various countries have been maintained to be not the
most favourable to life which are possible under the existing laws of
nature.[42]
[42] See Appendix XXXI.
A little reflection will enable us to assign its just value to such
criticism of creation. Remark, then, in the first place, that there may
be abundant evidence of intelligence where there is not evidence of
perfect intelligence. Although very considerable defects were clearly
shown to exist in the constitution and arrangements of the physical
world, there might yet be ample and unmistakable proof of the vast
wisdom of its Author. Were it even true that science could show that
the mechanism of the heavens, and the distribution of land and sea,
heat and cold, on earth, were not in every respect the best, that
would not prove that there was no intelligence, no design whatever,
involved therein. The question, Did the earth and the solar system
originate with intelligence? is distinct from the question, Was the
intelligence in which they originated perfect? It is conceivable that
the one question might have to be answered in the affirmative and the
other in the negative. It is obvious that the former question ought to
be considered apart from and before the latter. The theist proposes,
of course, to prove in the end that there is a perfect intelligence,
but he is content to establish at first that there is an intelligence.
Aware that whoever admits intelligence to be the first cause of the
universe may be forced also to admit that the creative intelligence is
perfect, he is under no temptation himself to confound two entirely
distinct questions, and he is obviously entitled to protest against so
illogical a procedure in others.
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