Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876Flint, Robert
Religion
Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876
Flint, Robert
Theism
Empedocles imagined; none except in the sense in which a man who gets
his leg broken is a monster. A monster is simply a being to whom an
accident not fatal has happened in the womb. Why should an accident not
occur there as well as elsewhere? Why should God not act by general
laws there as well as elsewhere? Who is entitled to say that any result
of His general laws is a failure; that any so-called accident was not
included in His plan; that a world in which a child could not be born
deformed nor a grown man have a leg broken, would be, were all things
taken into account, as good as the world in which we actually live?
Huxley, Lange, and those whom they represent, have failed to show
us any of nature's "bullets which have missed the mark," and have
not sufficiently, I think, realised how imperfect might be their own
perception of nature's target. The contrivances for the infliction
of pain and death displayed in the structure of animals of prey are
none the less evidences of intelligence because they are not also, at
least immediately or directly, evidences of beneficence. Intelligence
is one thing, benevolence is another, and what conclusively disproved
benevolence might conclusively prove intelligence.[44]
[44] See Appendix XXXIII.
II.
Let us pass on to the contemplation of greater difficulties; to
suffering, which seems to conflict with the benevolence of God--and to
sin, which seems irreconcilable with His righteousness.
I cannot agree with those who think that there is no mystery in mere
pain; that it is sufficiently accounted for by moral evil, and involves
no separate problem. The history of suffering began on our planet
long before that of sin; ages prior to the appearance of man, earth
was a scene of war and mutual destruction; hunger and fear, violence
and agony, disease and death, have prevailed throughout the air, the
land, and ocean, ever since they were tenanted. And what connection in
reason can there be between the sin of men or the sin of angels and
the suffering endured or inflicted by primeval saurians? The suffering
of the animals is, in fact, more mysterious than the suffering of
man, just because so little of the former and so much of the latter
can be traced, directly or indirectly, to sin. But every animal is
made subject to suffering; every animal appetite springs out of a
want; every sense and every faculty of every animal are so constituted
as to be in certain circumstances sources of pain; hosts of animals
are so constructed that they can only live by rending and devouring
other animals; no large animal can move without crushing and killing
numbers of minute yet sentient creatures. How can all this be under the
government of Infinite Goodness?
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