Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876Flint, Robert
Religion
Theism; being the Baird Lecture of 1876
Flint, Robert
Theism
There is an improper use of the fact that the emotional capacities as
well as the intellectual faculties are concerned in the apprehension of
God. Some persons express themselves as if there was an evidence for
God in the feelings not only as well as in the intellect, but distinct
from, and independent of, the evidence on which the intellect has to
decide. They reason as if although the latter were necessarily and in
its own nature inconclusive, the former might still warrant belief, or
as if at least feelings might so supplement weak arguments as to allow
of their conclusions being firmly held. They virtually acknowledge
that, although it were incontestably proved that the theistic inference
was such as could not reasonably be deemed trustworthy or sufficient
by the intellect, they would believe in the existence of God all the
same in reliance on their feelings, because the heart is as trustworthy
as the head and as well entitled to be heard. This is a very different
doctrine from what I regard to be the true one--namely, that neither
the head nor the heart is a competent witness in the case under
consideration when the one is dissociated from the other. Purity of
heart and obedience to the will of God enable us to see God and to know
His character and doctrine, but they do not dispense with vision and
knowledge, nor do they create a vision and knowledge which are distinct
from, and independent of, reason. The heart must be appealed to and
satisfied as well as the head, but not apart from or otherwise than
through the head, or the appeal is sophistical and the satisfaction
illegitimate. Our feelings largely determine whether we recognise and
assent to reasons or not, but they ought not to be substituted for
reasons, or even used to supplement reasons. The sentimentalism which
pleads feelings in deprecation of the rigid criticism of reasons, or
in order to retain a conviction which it cannot logically justify,
necessarily tends to scepticism, and, indeed, is a kind of scepticism.
NOTE X., page 86.
INTUITION, FEELING, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE IN RELIGION.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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