Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of EvilLeibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von
Religion
Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von
Free will and determinism; Theism; Theodicy
188. Nevertheless M. Bayle is in difficulties over this: he will not admit
plastic natures devoid of cognition, which Mr. Cudworth and others had
introduced, for fear that the modern Stratonists, that is, the Spinozists,
take advantage of it. This has involved him in disputes with M. le Clerc.
Under the influence of this error, that a non-intelligent cause can produce
nothing where contrivance appears, he is far from conceding to me that
_preformation_ which produces naturally the organs of animals, and _the
system of a harmony pre-established by God_ in bodies, to make them respond
in accordance with their own laws to the thoughts and the wills of souls.
But it ought to have been taken into account that this non-intelligent
cause, which produces such beautiful things in the grains and seeds of
plants and animals, and effects the actions of bodies as the will ordains
them, was formed by the hand of God: and God is infinitely more skilful
than a watchmaker, who himself makes machines and automata that are [246]
capable of producing as wonderful effects as if they possessed
intelligence.
189. Now to come to M. Bayle's apprehensions concerning the Stratonists, in
case one should admit truths that are not dependent upon the will of God:
he seems to fear lest they may take advantage against us of the perfect
regularity of the eternal verities. Since this regularity springs only from
the nature and necessity of things, without being directed by any
cognition, M. Bayle fears that one might with Strato thence infer that the
world also could have become regular through a blind necessity. But it is
easy to answer that. In the region of the eternal verities are found all
the possibles, and consequently the regular as well as the irregular: there
must be a reason accounting for the preference for order and regularity,
and this reason can only be found in understanding. Moreover these very
truths can have no existence without an understanding to take cognizance of
them; for they would not exist if there were no divine understanding
wherein they are realized, so to speak. Hence Strato does not attain his
end, which is to exclude cognition from that which enters into the origin
of things.
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