Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of EvilLeibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von
Religion
Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von
Free will and determinism; Theism; Theodicy
223. M. Arnauld and M. Bayle appear to maintain that this method of
explaining things and of establishing a best among all the plans for the
universe, one such as may not be surpassed by any other, sets a limit to
God's power. 'Have you considered', says M. Arnauld to Father Malebranche
(in his _Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace_, vol. II, p.
385), 'that in making such assumptions you take it upon yourself to subvert
the first article of the creed, whereby we make profession of believing in
God the Father Almighty?' He had said already (p. 362): 'Can one maintain,
without trying to blind oneself, that a course of action which could not
fail to have this grievous result, namely, that the majority of men perish,
bears the stamp of God's goodness more than a different course of action,
which would have caused, if God had followed it, the salvation of all men?'
And, as M. Jacquelot does not differ from the principles I have just laid
down, M. Bayle raises like objections in his case (_Reply to the Questions
of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 151, p. 900): 'If one adopts such
explanations', he says, 'one sees oneself constrained to renounce the most
obvious notions on the nature of the supremely perfect Being. These teach
us that all things not implying contradiction are possible for him, [267]
that consequently it is possible for him to save people whom he does not
save: for what contradiction would result supposing the number of the elect
were greater than it is? They teach us besides that, since he is supremely
happy, he has no will which he cannot carry out. How, then, shall we
understand that he wills to save all men and that he cannot do so? We
sought some light to help us out of the perplexities we feel in comparing
the idea of God with the state of the human kind, and lo! we are given
elucidations that cast us into darkness more dense.'
224. All these obstacles vanish before the exposition I have just given. I
agree with M. Bayle's principle, and it is also mine, that everything
implying no contradiction is possible. But as for me, holding as I do that
God did the best that was possible, or that he could not have done better
than he has done, deeming also that to pass any other judgement upon his
work in its entirety would be to wrong his goodness or his wisdom, I must
say that to make something which surpasses in goodness the best itself,
that indeed would imply contradiction. That would be as if someone
maintained that God could draw from one point to another a line shorter
than the straight line, and accused those who deny this of subverting the
article of faith whereby we believe in God the Father Almighty.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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