235. In a word, when one speaks of the _possibility_ of a thing it is not a question of the causes that can bring about or prevent its actual existence: otherwise one would change the nature of the terms, and render useless the distinction between the possible and the actual. This Abelard did, and Wyclif appears to have done after him, in consequence of which they fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions. That is why, when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary, and brings in the consideration of what God wills or chooses, one alters the issue. For God chooses among the possibles, and for that very reason he chooses [273] freely, and is not compelled; there would be neither choice nor freedom if there were but one course possible. 236. One must also answer M. Bayle's syllogisms, so as to neglect none of the objections of a man so gifted: they occur in Chapter 151 of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, pp. 900, 901). FIRST SYLLOGISM 'God can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has for his wisdom. 'Now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which God has for his wisdom. 'Therefore God cannot will the salvation of all men.' The major is self-evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite is necessary. But the minor cannot be accepted, for, albeit God loves his wisdom of necessity, the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot but be free, and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do not cease to be possible. Moreover, his wisdom has prompted him to will the salvation of all men, but not by a consequent and decretory will. Yet this consequent will, being only a result of free antecedent acts of will, cannot fail to be free also. SECOND SYLLOGISM 'The work most worthy of God's wisdom involves amongst other things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men. 'Now God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom. 'He wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst other things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men.' The major holds good, but the minor I deny. The decrees of God are always free, even though God be always prompted thereto by reasons which lie in the intention towards good: for to be morally compelled by wisdom, to be bound by the consideration of good, is to be free; it is not compulsion in the metaphysical sense. And metaphysical necessity alone, as I have observed so many times, is opposed to freedom.