Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of EvilLeibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von
Religion
Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von
Free will and determinism; Theism; Theodicy
Homer and divers other poets were of another mind, and men in general agree
with them. The reason for this is that the evil arouses our attention
rather than the good: but this same reason proves that the evil is more
rare. One must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of Pliny, who
would have it that Nature is a stepmother, and who maintains that man is
the most unhappy and most vain of all creatures. These two epithets do not
agree: one is not so very unhappy, when one is full of oneself. It is [285]
true that men hold human nature only too much in contempt, apparently
because they see no other creatures capable of arousing their emulation;
but they have all too much self-esteem, and individually are but too easily
satisfied. I therefore agree with Meric Casaubon, who in his notes on the
Xenophanes of Diogenes Laertius praises exceedingly the admirable
sentiments of Euripides, going so far as to credit him with having said
things _quae spirant_ [Greek: theopneuston] _pectus_. Seneca (Lib. 4, c. 5,
_De Benefic._) speaks eloquently of the blessings Nature has heaped upon
us. M. Bayle in his _Dictionary_, article 'Xenophanes', brings up sundry
authorities against this, and among others that of the poet Diphilus in the
Collections of Stobaeus, whose Greek might be thus expressed in Latin:
_Fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens,_
_Infundit uno terna pro bono mala._
259. M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of
guilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to the
advantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action. To that I am not
opposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the effect of
original sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point men in
general exaggerate things, and that even some theologians disparage man so
much that they wrong the providence of the Author of mankind. That is why I
am not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion by
saying that the virtues of the pagans were only _splendida peccata_,
splendid vices. It is a sally of St. Augustine's which has no foundation in
holy Scripture, and which offends reason. But here we are only discussing a
physical good and evil, and one must compare in detail the prosperities and
the adversities of this life. M. Bayle would wish almost to set aside the
consideration of health; he likens it to the rarefied bodies, which are
scarcely felt, like air, for example; but he likens pain to the bodies that
have much density and much weight in slight volume. But pain itself makes
us aware of the importance of health when we are bereft of it. I have
already observed that excess of physical pleasures would be a real evil,
and the matter ought not to be otherwise; it is too important for the
spirit to be free. Lactantius (_Divin. Instit._, lib. 3, cap. 18) had said
that men are so squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill, as if it
swallowed up all the goods they have enjoyed.
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