straight line, would turn aside all at once from its path, without any[320] reason, simply because the will so commands. Take note moreover that he resorted to that only to justify this alleged freedom of complete indifference, a chimerical notion which appears to be of very ancient origin; and one may with good reason say: _Chimaera Chimaeram parit_. 321. This is the way Signor Marchetti has expressed it in his admirable translation of Lucretius into Italian verse, which has not yet been published (Book 2): _Ma ch'i principii poi non corran punto_ _Della lor dritta via, chi veder puote?_ _Si finalmente ogni lor moto sempre_ _Insieme s'aggruppa, e dall' antico_ _Sempre con ordin certo il nuovo nasce;_ _Ne tracciando i primi semi, fanno_ _Di moto un tal principio, il qual poi rompa_ _I decreti del fato, accio non segua_ _L'una causa dell' altra in infinito;_ _Onde han questa, dich' io_, del fato sciolta Libera volunta, _per cui ciascuno_ _Va dove piu l'agrada? I moti ancora_ _Si declinan sovente, e non in tempo_ _Certo, ne certa region, ma solo_ _Quando e dove commanda il nostro arbitrio;_ _Poiche senz' alcun dubbio a queste cose_ _Da sol principio il voler proprio, e quindi_ _Van poi scorrendo per le membra i moti._ It is comical that a man like Epicurus, after having discarded the gods and all incorporeal substances, could have supposed that the will, which he himself takes as composed of atoms, could have had control over the atoms, and diverted them from their path, without its being possible for one to say how. 322. Carneades, not going so far back as to the atoms, claimed to find at once in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague indifference, assuming as reason for the thing just that for which Epicurus sought a reason. Carneades gained nothing thereby, except that he more easily deceived careless people, in transferring the absurdity from one subject, where it is somewhat too evident, to another subject where it is easier to confuse matters, that is to say, from the body to the soul. For most philosophers had not very distinct notions of the nature of the soul. [321] Epicurus, who composed it of atoms, was at least right in seeking the origin of its determination in that which he believed to be the origin of the soul itself. That is why Cicero and M. Bayle were wrong to find so much fault with him, and to be indulgent towards, and even praise, Carneades, who is no less irrational. I do not understand how M. Bayle, who was so clear-sighted, was thus satisfied by a disguised absurdity, even to the extent of calling it the greatest effort the human mind can make on this matter. It is as if the soul, which is the seat of reason, were more capable than the body of acting without being determined by some reason or cause, internal or external; or as if the great principle which states that nothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body.