(1) The tendencies of conduct to promote true happiness, or the
contrary, furnish, in fact, a valuable practical rule in questions
of right and duty. For, by the moral constitution of the world,
right-doing, despite the disorders that temporarily obstruct and
confuse the real law of consequences, is the way of true welfare.
Happiness, in the true, though not hedonistic sense, is an end of our
being, and virtue is conducive to it. "The way of the transgressor
is hard," under the law of natural cause and effect. The utilitarian
theory therefore justly appeals to the great lessons of experienced
utility to show the way of duty and guide conduct into righteousness.
So that while utility does not explain why an act is right, it becomes,
if correctly interpreted, a principle of great value in determining the
right.
(2) It is unquestionably true that the altruistic principle of "the
greatest good to the greatest number" presents a principle of genuine
moral authority. It opens to view the whole realm of obligation to
beneficent activity and self-sacrifice. It points to deeds that are
noblest in life and highest in ethical character. It even gives a
reason for their obligatoriness. In this form the theory no longer
bases duty simply on one's own personal enjoyment or advantage,
identifying morality with supreme selfishness, but lifts it into the
sphere of benevolence and doing good. For, in altruism individual
enjoyment and interests are necessarily subordinated to the well-being
of the many. And when utility is thus put into the service of love
or good-will, it carries the quality of right into wide ranges of
purpose and conduct. It will be observed, however, that the theory
thus obtains its appearance of explaining the foundation of right and
duty only after "utility" has been itself changed and identified with
the virtue of active good-will or beneficence which, of course, is
right and obligatory to the degree of every man's ability. In other
words, only when it ceases to be purely and really a utilitarian
theory, and stands in the name and rights of benevolence--getting
ethical authority surreptitiously from the quality of love instead of
"profitableness"--does it also get the plausibility that it seems to
possess.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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