Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of ConsciousnessBergson, Henri
Philosophy
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Bergson, Henri
Consciousness; Free will and determinism; Space and time
Hence there are finally two different selves, one of which is, as
it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial and,
so to speak, social representation. We reach the former by deep
introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states as living
things, constantly _becoming,_ as states not amenable to measure,
which permeate one another and of which the succession in duration has
nothing in common with juxtaposition in homogeneous space. But the
moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is just
why we are rarely free. The greater part of the time we live outside
ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a
colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space.
Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for the
external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than think;
we "are acted" rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover
possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration.
[Sidenote: Kant clung to freedom, but put the self which is free
outside both space and time.]
Kant's great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium. He did
not notice that real duration is made up of moments inside one another,
and that when it seems to assume the form of a homogeneous whole, it
is because it gets expressed in space. Thus the very distinction which
he makes between space and time amounts at bottom to confusing time
with space, and the symbolical representation of the ego with the ego
itself. He thought that consciousness was incapable of perceiving
psychic states otherwise than by juxtaposition, forgetting that a
medium in which these states are set side by side and distinguished
from one another is of course space, and not duration. He was thereby
led to believe that the same states can recur in the depths of
consciousness, just as the same physical phenomena are repeated in
space; this at least is what he implicitly admitted when he ascribed to
the causal relation the same meaning and the same function in the inner
as in the outer world. Thus freedom was made into an incomprehensible
fact. And yet, owing to his unlimited though unconscious confidence
in this inner perception whose scope he tried to restrict, his belief
in freedom remained unshakable. He therefore raised it to the sphere
of noumena; and as he had confused duration with space, he made this
genuine free self, which is indeed outside space, into a self which is
supposed to be outside duration too, and therefore out of the reach
of our faculty of knowledge. But the truth is that we perceive this
self whenever, by a strenuous effort of reflection, we turn our eyes
from the shadow which follows us and retire into ourselves. Though we
generally live and act outside our own person, in space rather than
in duration, and though by this means we give a handle to the law of
causality, which binds the same effects to the same causes, we can
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