Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of ConsciousnessBergson, Henri
Philosophy
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Bergson, Henri
Consciousness; Free will and determinism; Space and time
To give this argument a stricter form, let us imagine a straight line
of unlimited length, and on this line a material point A, which
moves. If this point were conscious of itself, it would feel itself
change, since it moves: it would perceive a succession; but would
this succession assume for it the form of a line? No doubt it would,
if it could rise, so to speak, above the line which it traverses, and
perceive simultaneously several points of it in juxtaposition: but
by doing so it would form the idea of space, and it is in space and
not in pure duration that it would see displayed the changes which it
undergoes. We here put our finger on the mistake of those who regard
pure duration as something similar to space, but of a simpler nature.
They are fond of setting psychic states side by side, of forming a
chain or a line of them, and do not imagine that they are introducing
into this operation the idea of space properly so called, the idea of
space in its totality, because space is a medium of three dimensions.
But how can they fail to notice that, in order to perceive a line as
a line, it is necessary to take up a position outside it, to take
account of the void which surrounds it, and consequently to think
a space of three dimensions? If our conscious point A does not yet
possess the idea of space--and this is the hypothesis which we have
agreed to adopt--the succession of states through which it passes
cannot assume for it the form of a line; but its sensations will add
themselves dynamically to one another and will organize themselves,
like the successive notes of a tune by which we allow ourselves to be
lulled and soothed. In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but
a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one
another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize
themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with
number: it would be pure heterogeneity. But for the present we shall
not insist upon this point; it is enough for us to have shown that,
from the moment when you attribute the least homogeneity to duration,
you surreptitiously introduce space.
[Sidenote: Pure duration is wholly qualitative. It cannot be measured
unless symbolically represented in space.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account