Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of ConsciousnessBergson, Henri
Philosophy
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Bergson, Henri
Consciousness; Free will and determinism; Space and time
you under the form of a line of fire, and the absolutely indivisible
sensation of motion or mobility. A rapid gesture, made with one's eyes
shut, will assume for consciousness the form of a purely qualitative
sensation as long as there is no thought of the space traversed. In
a word, there are two elements to be distinguished in motion, the
space traversed and the act by which we traverse it, the successive
positions and the synthesis of these positions. The first of these
elements is a homogeneous quantity: the second has no reality except in
a consciousness: it is a quality or an intensity, whichever you prefer.
But here again we meet with a case of endosmosis, an intermingling
of the purely intensive sensation of mobility with the extensive
representation of the space traversed. On the one hand we attribute to
the motion the divisibility of the space which it traverses, forgetting
that it is quite possible to divide an _object,_ but not an _act_: and
on the other hand we accustom ourselves to projecting this act itself
into space, to applying it to the whole of the line which the moving
body traverses, in a word, to solidifying it: as if this localizing of
a _progress_ in space did not amount to asserting that, even outside
consciousness, the past co-exists along with the present!
[Sidenote: The common confusion between motion and the space traversed
gives rise to the paradoxes of the Eleatics.]
It is to this confusion between motion and the space traversed that the
paradoxes of the Eleatics are due; for the interval which separates two
points is infinitely divisible, and if motion consisted of parts like
those of the interval itself, the interval would never be crossed.
But the truth is that each of Achilles' steps is a simple indivisible
act, and that, after a given number of these acts, Achilles will have
passed the tortoise. The mistake of the Eleatics arises from their
identification of this series of acts, each of which is _of a definite
kind_ and _indivisible,_ with the homogeneous space which underlies
them. As this space can be divided and put together again according
to any law whatever, they think they are justified in reconstructing
Achilles' whole movement, not with Achilles' kind of step, but with
the tortoise's kind: in place of Achilles pursuing the tortoise they
really put two tortoises, regulated by each other, two tortoises which
agree to make the same kind of steps or simultaneous acts, so as
never to catch one another. Why does Achilles outstrip the tortoise?
Because each of Achilles' steps and each of the tortoise's steps are
indivisible acts in so far as they are movements, and are different
magnitudes in so far as they are space: so that addition will soon give
a greater length for the space traversed by Achilles than is obtained
by adding together the space traversed by the tortoise and the handicap
with which it started. This is what Zeno leaves out of account when he
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