Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of ConsciousnessBergson, Henri
Philosophy
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Bergson, Henri
Consciousness; Free will and determinism; Space and time
It had thus ascertained in its own way the
succession of four strokes, but quite otherwise than by a process
of addition, and without bringing in the image of a juxtaposition of
distinct terms. In a word, the number of strokes was perceived as a
quality and not as a quantity: it is thus that duration is presented to
immediate consciousness, and it retains this form so long as it does
not give place to a symbolical representation derived from extensity.
[Sidenote: There are therefore two forms of multiplicity, of duration
and conscious life.]
We should therefore distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two very
different ways of regarding duration, two aspects of conscious life.
Below homogeneous duration, which is the extensive symbol of true
duration, a close psychological analysis distinguishes a duration
whose heterogeneous moments permeate one another; below the numerical
multiplicity of conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below
the self with well-defined states, a self in which _succeeding each
other_ means _melting into one another_ and forming an organic whole.
But we are generally content with the first, i.e. with the shadow of
the self projected into homogeneous space. Consciousness, goaded by an
insatiable desire to separate, substitutes the symbol for the reality,
or perceives the reality only through the symbol. As the self thus
refracted, and thereby broken to pieces, is much better adapted to the
requirements of social life in general and language in particular,
consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental
self.
[Sidenote: The two aspects of our conscious states.]
In order to recover this fundamental self, as the unsophisticated
consciousness would perceive it, a vigorous effort of analysis is
necessary, which will isolate the fluid inner states from their image,
first refracted, then solidified in homogeneous space. In other words,
our perceptions, sensations, emotions and ideas occur under two
aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused,
ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold
of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common-place
forms without making it into public property. If we have been led to
distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two forms of duration, we must
expect each conscious state, taken by itself, to assume a different
aspect according as we consider it within a discrete multiplicity or a
confused multiplicity, in the time as quality, in which it is produced,
or in the time as quantity, into which it is projected.
[Sidenote: One of which is due to the solidifying influence of external
objects and language on our constantly changing feelings.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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