Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of ConsciousnessBergson, Henri
Philosophy
Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness
Bergson, Henri
Consciousness; Free will and determinism; Space and time
[Sidenote: On the surface our conscious states obey the laws of
association. Deeper down they interpenetrate and form a part of
ourselves.]
We should experience the same sort of surprise if we strove to seize
our ideas themselves in their natural state, as our consciousness would
perceive them if it were no longer beset by space. This breaking up
of the constituent elements of an idea, which issues in abstraction,
is too convenient for us to do without it in ordinary life and even
in philosophical discussion. But when we fancy that the parts thus
artificially separated are the genuine threads with which the concrete
idea was woven, when, substituting for the interpenetration of the real
terms the juxtaposition of their symbols, we claim to make duration
out of space, we unavoidably fall into the mistakes of associationism.
We shall not insist on the latter point, which will be the subject of
a thorough examination in the next chapter. Let it be enough to say
that the impulsive zeal with which we take sides on certain questions
shows how our intellect has its instincts--and what can an instinct
of this kind be if not an impetus common to all our ideas, i.e. their
very interpenetration? The beliefs to which we most strongly adhere are
those of which we should find it most difficult to give an account, and
the reasons by which we justify them are seldom those which have led
us to adopt them. In a certain sense we have adopted them without any
reason, for what makes them valuable in our eyes is that they match the
colour of all our other ideas, and that from the very first we have
seen in them something of ourselves. Hence they do not take in our
minds that common looking form which they will assume as soon as we try
to give expression to them in words; and, although they bear the same
name in other minds, they are by no means the same thing. The fact is
that each of them has the same kind of life as a cell in an organism:
everything which affects the general state of the self affects it also.
But while the cell occupies a definite point in the organism, an idea
which is truly ours fills the whole of our self. Not all our ideas,
however, are thus incorporated in the fluid mass of our conscious
states. Many float on the surface, like dead leaves on the water of a
pond: the mind, when it thinks them over and over again, finds them
ever the same, as if they were external to it. Among these are the
ideas which we receive ready made, and which remain in us without ever
being properly assimilated, or again the ideas which we have omitted
to cherish and which have withered in neglect. If, in proportion as we
get away from the deeper strata of the self, our conscious states tend
more and more to assume the form of a numerical multiplicity, and to
spread out in a homogeneous space, it is just because these conscious
states tend to become more and more lifeless, more and more impersonal.
Hence we need not be surprised if only those ideas which least belong
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