To Kiel in the 'Hercules'Freeman, Lewis R. (Lewis Ransome)
History
To Kiel in the 'Hercules'
Freeman, Lewis R. (Lewis Ransome)
Allied Naval Armistice Commission; Hercules (Battleship); World War, 1914-1918 -- Air-fleet bases, Naval -- Germany
"We also made the torpedo a relatively more important feature of the
armament of all of our ships--from destroyers to battleships--than
you did. They were to be our "last ditch" defence in the event of our
being drawn into a general fleet action--just such an action, in fact,
as the battle of Horn Reef was. We knew all about your gunnery up to
the outbreak of the war, and the fact that the big-gun target practices
were only at moderate ranges--mostly under 16,000 metres--told us that
you were not expecting to engage us at greater ranges. But all the time
we were meeting with good success in shooting at ranges up to, and even
a good deal over, 20,000 metres, and so we felt sure of having all the
best of a fight at such ranges. We knew that our 11-inch guns would
greatly out-range your 12-inch (perhaps you already know that even
the 8.2-inch guns of the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ out-ranged the
12-inch guns of the _Invincible_ and _Indefatigable_ at the Falkland
battle), and we hoped they might even have the best of your 13.5's.
We also knew that our ships were better built than yours to withstand
the plunging fall of long-distance shots, and we felt sure that our
explosive was more powerful than your lyddite. I am not sure that
this proved to be the case, though there is no question that our hits
generally did more harm than yours because more of them penetrated decks
and armour.
"Feeling confident, then, of having the best of a long-range action,
our plan was, as I have said, to use the torpedo as a 'last ditch'
defence in case the English fleet tried to reduce the range to one at
which it could be sure of securing a higher percentage of hits and thus
making the greater weight of its broadside decisively felt. In such a
contingency we planned to literally fill the sea with torpedoes, on
the theory that enough of them must find their targets to damage the
enemy fleet sufficiently to force it to open out the range again, and
perhaps to cripple it to an extent that would open the way for us to
win a decisive victory. Theoretically, this plan was quite sound, for
it was based on the generally recognized fact that from three to five
torpedoes--the number varying according to the range and the interval
between the targets--launched one after the other at a line of ships
_cannot_ fail to hit at least one of them, providing, of course, that
they all run properly.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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