If this seem a novel proposition to the reader I will ask him not to grow impatient, for the demonstration will grow upon him as he reflects. It will seem novel, for if true all the laws and statutes for the regulation of combinations are so much waste of time and paper and the hours of legislatures and courts. In the acceptance of such explanation of the trust problem must go the rejection of many proposed remedies, among them the much-lauded one of “publicity.” While publicity is always to be commended and sought for in public or semi-public matters, it does not appear that laws enforcing publicity upon purely private industrial combinations are founded upon equity. Nor is it likely that publicity will assure us the possession of knowledge beyond what we already have through the work of independent investigators. Nor is it probable that enforced publicity will elicit impartial truth. This proposition is of a piece with the punitive theory in the treatment of the problem, a theory which has already led the people far astray. Men shrink instinctively from such stringent regulation, and this is a true index of the moral relation, if we may so speak, of this problem to legislation. But because they will not think clearly they return to the proposition of legal interposition. Along with the remedy of “publicity” must go all laws, existing or proposed, limiting capitalization or stock watering. Beyond the fact that such laws would often force capitalization below the earning capacity—which is no unfair basis of capitalization—it must be said that the evils of stock watering are largely imaginary. It is true that over-capitalization may conceal from the public the real extent of monopoly profits, and is for this purpose, if for no other, often resorted to. But this of itself ought to constitute no valid reason for drastic legislation. Investors ought to be left free to take their own risks, and speculative ventures ought to be left free to fix their own capitalization, for otherwise perfectly legitimate, if largely speculative, business interests may be made to suffer injuriously to the interests of the community. But laying aside for the time all considerations of this kind, stock watering is only a symptom—a sign that monopolistic powers, and not legitimate business interests, are being capitalized.[2] High capitalization, it is sometimes said, tends to increase price. It does offer temptation to increase of price, but nothing can put it within the power of combinations to increase price save the forces of monopoly. This power you do not increase or decrease by adding to the numbers of the counters, the considerations governing which are purely those of the stock-gambling fraternity.