Just as there is a limit fixed to the bounds of competition, so there is a limit to the bounds of combination. The maximum of combination and the maximum of efficiency are not the same. There is a point in the progress of combination beyond which it does not, or would not naturally advance—and that is when it reaches the maximum of efficiency. It seems very likely that the element of monopoly in society today forces combination far beyond the point of the most efficient co-operation. These natural laws may not be “regulated.” Such laws are not for regulation, but for obedience. We may impede, we may interrupt their operation, but only to our injury. The most we can do is to regulate our institution by these laws, as we trim a sail to the wind and tides; we do not attempt to “regulate” wind and tides; and these laws of co-operation and competition are of the same order—natural laws which to disobey is to be destroyed. We hear much superficial talk about “the wastes of competition.” The Socialists play into the hands of the trust apologists who defend them on the ground that competition leads to waste. Beyond the fact that competition has never yet been fully tried, that it has never yet been wholly free, and that such waste as it entails is inseparable from the natural process which weeds out the incompetent, the antedated and the unskilled—a process of which the waste is but incidental to the conservation—is that these combinations do not seek primarily to escape the waste of competition so much as to avail themselves of those artificial laws which prevent competition from doing its perfect work. The term expressing the opposite of competition is not combination, but monopoly. Professor Jenks, in his work, “The Trust Problem,” falls into this error when he speaks of combinations in the retail trade as overcoming the “friction” of competition, instancing associations of hardware dealers, druggists, etc. Here, he says, we have an element of combination from which he assumes the element of competition has been eliminated. But his error is in the analogy he seeks to establish between such agreements from which the element of competition cannot be expelled, and agreements which are based upon the control of some special privilege created by law, and of which the great railroad and industrial trusts are examples, and which people have in mind when they talk of the “trust problem.”