It will doubtless be objected that there is a world of difference between the occasional willingness of a group of Powers to take concerted action upon a particular occasion, for which each reserves full liberty of determination as to whether and to what extent it will cooperate, and the proposal before us. It is absurd, we shall be told, to expect that States bred in the sense of sovereignty and military pride will seriously entertain a proposal which may bring them into war in a quarrel not specifically theirs and compel them to furnish troops to serve under an international staff. But many events that have seemed as absurd are brought to pass. A few decades ago nothing would have seemed more absurd than to suppose that our nation would be willing to equip an Expeditionary Force of several million men to operate upon the Continent under the supreme control of a French general. Whether, in fact, such cooperation as we here desiderate is feasible at any early period will depend upon two factors: first, the realization on the part of Governments and peoples of the civilized world of the supreme importance of the issue at stake in this endeavor to lay a strong foundation for the society of nations; secondly, the diminution in the influence of militarism and navalism as factors in national life that is likely to occur if sufficient belief in the permanence and efficacy of the new arrangement is once secured. If nations can be brought to believe that national armies and navies are too dangerous toys to be entrusted to the indiscretion of the national statesmen and generals, and are only safe if they are held in trust for the wider world community, this conviction will modify the surviving sentiments of national pride and national pugnacity and make it easier to accept the new international status. Moreover, if, as the first-fruits of the new order, a sensible reduction of national armaments can be achieved, this lessening of the part which armed force plays within each national economy will be attended by a corresponding increase in the willingness to place the reduced forces at the international disposal. For the root motive of the international policy is the desire of each nation to get a larger amount of security at a smaller cost than under the old order. Those, therefore, who confidently assert that States will not consent on any terms to entrust their national forces to an international command for the maintenance of the treaty obligations under the proposed scheme in effect simply assert the permanency of the reign of unreason in the relations between States.