Towards an enduring peace : $b A symposium of peace proposals and programs 1914-1916
History
Towards an enduring peace : $b A symposium of peace proposals and programs 1914-1916
Peace; World War, 1914-1918 -- Peace
The formula of an enduring peace must be to remove all the causes of
strife in Europe, and we shall succeed only if we can satisfy the enemy’s
legitimate claims while we secure justice for our friends. The general
idea must be, win from him the largest recognition of the idea of
nationality, while conceding to him the economic opportunities which he
requires. The more, by the ordinary working of barter that we concede,
the more shall we obtain. Let us attempt to sketch what the main lines of
such an exchange might be.
(A)—ACTS OF RESTORATION
1.—Belgium must be restored, Serbia re-instated, and French territory
evacuated.
2.—The German colonies must either be restored, or equivalent territories
provided.
(B)—CLAIMS OF NATIONALITY
3.—The ideal solution for Poland, in a political sense, would be
independence. But could a land-locked State, between three great military
empires, ever be secure? The Poles, themselves, are not averse to the
idea of their re-union as a State within the Austrian Empire. If they
had the same status as Hungary, they would be internally independent.
But if Europe consented to allow this accession of territory to Austria,
conditions might be laid down. It might be stipulated that a like status
should be given to Bohemia, and to the Serbo-Croats of Croatia, Bosnia
and Dalmatia. Thus Austria would become a quintuple Federal Empire
(Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, Jugoslavia), and one of the main
problems of the war, the liberation of the Western Slavs, would be
satisfactorily solved.
In return for this extension of territory Austria might be required to
cede the Eastern (Ruthenian) part of Galicia to Russia, and the Trentino
to Italy.
4.—The chief difficulty lies in Alsace-Lorraine. Let us make the bold
claim that it must be restored to France (or such parts of it as desire
this change). What can we offer as a _quid pro quo_? The following
economic concessions suggest themselves (5, 6, and 7).
(C)—ECONOMIC CLAIMS
5.—That Germany be allowed to complete that closer economic union
with her Allies, and especially Austria, which seems to be her chief
objective. We cannot prevent the creation of “Mid-Europe” as an economic
unity, but we might reply to it by a boycott. An amiable regulation of
tariff questions is a necessity for peace.
6.—We might further agree not to oppose such economic expansion (railway
and irrigation schemes) in Turkey as Germany can arrange. Turkey would
become a German economic sphere, but there must be guarantees for the
fair treatment of the trade in goods of other Powers.
7.—A general measure by which all Powers renounced differential tariffs
in their tropical colonies would ease the struggle for territory. France
would be reluctant to agree to this, but the condition is that she
secures Alsace.
(D)—OTHER ISSUES
8.—The greater part of Macedonia, in accordance with the principle of
nationality, must go to Bulgaria.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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