Now in any discussion of the feasibility of such a concert of European or world Powers as will by mutual agreement secure disarmament and a settlement of differences by judicial methods, it must be recognized at the outset that this war may make the successful pursuance of such a policy more difficult than it would have been before. A Balance of Power, whatever may have been its other disadvantages, seemed in itself favorable to the possibilities of an agreement in which each nation, or group of nations, might be an equal gainer. But a decisive victory in war, which leaves the Allied nations with a strong preponderance of power, is less likely to yield a satisfactory basis of agreement for a mutual disarmament. Is it likely that they will readily consent to a reduction in their several military and naval forces equivalent to the reduction they will demand in the forces of the nations that have been their enemies? To put the difficulty in concrete terms: Would France consent to an early reduction of her army upon terms which would leave her fighting-strength as compared with that of Germany relatively the same as before the war? Would Great Britain consent to reduce her navy in the same proportion as the reduction she required of Germany? Even if the Allies believed that the proportionate reduction would be duly carried out by Germany, would they regard such an arrangement as affording the desired security? Obviously not. It may, of course, be urged that an agreed basis of reduction might be reached, according to which the relative strength of army and navy assigned to Germany would be smaller than before. But the more closely the proposition is examined the less feasible does it appear. What basis for the size of armies could reasonably, or even plausibly, be suggested which would not assign to Germany a larger preponderance over France in number of soldiers than she possesses at present? Size of population, or of frontiers, the two most reasonable considerations for apportioning defensive needs, would tell in favor of Germany against France. True it would tell even more strongly in favor of Russia, assigning her, in fact, a relatively larger military predominance in Europe than she has ever claimed. But would either France or Germany regard the new military situation as safe or desirable? Nor would there be any permanence in an arrangement based on such a mutable factor as population, according to which the German preponderance over France and of Russia over Germany would be continually increasing. If area of territory, as well as population and frontiers, were taken into consideration in fixing a basis, France would come off a little better in relation to Germany, but the size of Russia, even if her European lands were alone included, would give her an overwhelming advantage. If, as might not unreasonably be claimed, the extra-European possessions of Russia, Great Britain, and France must be reckoned in, either on a basis