My Lords, I have heard it said that the King could make a peer, but that he could not make a gentleman; I am sure that he cannot make a rogue an honest man. This pardon, therefore, at the utmost can only avert the punishment which follows from the sentence. It cannot remove the guilt of this man, though it may save his life. Can it, indeed, my Lords, be supposed that this amiable prerogative, lodged in the hands of the King for the wisest of purposes, and to be exerted by him as the father of his people, should have the effect to let loose persons upon society, as honest, respectable men, as men who may be witnesses, who may be jurymen, and may decide upon your lives or my life to-morrow, although these very persons were yesterday in the eye of the law and the eye of reason held as hardened villains from whom no man was safe, considered as wretches guilty of, and fitted to, perpetrate the most abominable crimes; and that although every man knows them to be the same as they were, and is equally afraid of, and would as little trust them as before they obtained a remission of their crimes? My Lord Advocate has talked of their obtaining a new credit by the pardon. What is this, my Lords? Can it be a new credit to cheat and rob and plunder? Is this pardon to operate like a settlement in a banker’s books, when he opens a new credit upon the next page, after old scores are cleared off? My Lords, it is impossible. To suppose a pardon to have such effects is to suppose it the most unjustifiable of all things. My Lords, I am willing to allow that this pardon should have every consequence beneficial to Mr. Brown; that he should derive all the benefit from it which the pardon itself expressly declares to be competent to him, and that no part of the punishment to which he was liable before this extension of His Majesty’s clemency can now be inflicted upon him. But this is very different from the proposition, that he is a good evidence in this or any other cause; it is no part of his punishment that he is not allowed to swear away the life of his neighbour; on the contrary, it is rather a favour to him. That he is intestable was never a punishment even before the pardon was granted; it is only a consequence of the sentence for a crime of an infamous nature which fixes an indelible character upon him, and describes him as a man whose testimony is worthy of no regard; and that character is no more removed by the pardon than the original truth and authenticity of the evidence upon which he was convicted is falsified by it; on the contrary, the pardon contains in itself the most unexceptionable evidence of the guilt and infamy of the person who is obliged to plead it.