Mr. WIGHT--My Lords, before your Lordships proceed to pronounce judgment, I have an objection to state on behalf of the prisoners at the bar, which, in my opinion, ought to prevent any judgment from passing upon this verdict. My Lords, from the evidence taken in the course of this trial, it appears that the libel is insufficient, in so far as it charges “that the pannels did wickedly and feloniously break into _the_ house in which the General Excise Office for Scotland was then kept,” whereas it ought to have stated that they so broke into _one_ of the houses so kept, describing such house particularly. For it appears from the proof that there were two separate and distinct houses in which the General Excise Office for Scotland was then kept, on the opposite sides of the court, and at a considerable distance from each other. Besides, my Lords, supposing this uncertainty in the libel as to the _locus delicti_ were insufficient to operate an arrest in judgment, yet no judgment can pass upon the verdict of the jury, on account of the uncertainty thereof, inasmuch as it finds in general terms the pannels guilty of the crime libelled; by which it is found that they have been guilty of breaking into the house in which the General Excise Office for Scotland was then kept, without distinguishing to which of the two before-mentioned houses the verdict applies. And the present plea in arrest of judgment deserves the greater consideration on this account, that the jury were called upon, by the manner in which the proof was conducted on the part of the pannels, to attend particularly to the circumstance of the Excise Office being kept in two separate and distinct houses. The LORD ADVOCATE--My Lords, I am not a little surprised that an objection of this nature should be brought forward at this time. This plea resolves into an objection to the relevancy or form of the indictment, which ought to have been stated _in limine_. If the gentlemen on the other side of the bar meant to have stated any such objection as the present, they ought to have done it yesterday. But after they have allowed the indictment to pass without any such objection; after your Lordships have sustained it as relevant, and remitted it to the knowledge of an assize in common form; and when the jury have returned a verdict finding the prisoners guilty of the crime charged--there can be no room for any further proceeding, except to pronounce the sentence of the law upon the verdict so returned. I do therefore, my Lords, altogether deny that it is competent, in this stage of the trial, to bring forward an objection such as the present, which ought to have been stated at first, and which your Lordships cannot now enter upon.