of these evils must be inflicted on those who are engaged in our own lawful commerce, if such a search be applied to them. Now if we were bound by a rigid principle to do this, these arguments must be rejected, as not affecting a case of conscience; but in this case we are not trying the value of a rigid principle. The principle would be intelligible which dictated the absolute interdiction of all commerce with every place from which a single Slave was exported; or, further still, with every place from which a Slave Trade was carried on, such as Cuba and Brazil; or if it dictated a prohibition to send goods where there was a probability that they might be exchanged for Slaves. But this arbitrary and uncertain limitation, so little capable of being referred to strict principle, and yet so injurious to lawful commerce, can only rest on the ground of its expediency, of its tendency to attain or promote the object; must submit to be tried by that test, and so tried will be found wanting. It is no doubt galling to a zealous and gallant officer, engaged in the service of his country and humanity in watching anxiously a well-known slaver’s haunt, to see foreign vessels, still more vessels bearing his own country’s flag, passing inwards and supplying those goods, though innocent in themselves, which are the medium of an atrocious traffic; it is not surprising that under such circumstances that feeling should have arisen which appears in Dr. Madden’s Report, and in the Evidence of several, especially the naval, Witnesses. It is a feeling natural and honourable in itself; and we hope that the English merchant, animated as he is by the same feelings of horror for the Slave Trade, will endeavour to extend the influence of those feelings through the whole circle of his transactions. But we cannot recommend that a provision so difficult to be carried out, so vexatious and yet so ineffectual for its object, should be made the subject of Legislation.