I understand that my learned friend, Mr. Larocque, supposes that the ordinance of repeal of South Carolina, constitutionally or unconstitutionally supported by the strength to maintain its independence, has changed these four men who are indicted here and are proved to be citizens of the United States, from their condition of citizens of the United States; and he holds, and asks as legal proposition from your honors, that, at the time of the commission of this crime, these men were not citizens of the United States, by reason of the constitutional right of South Carolina to carry itself out of the Union, by force of ordinances, or supported by military power that had maintained itself up to the first of June in the possession of independent power. Your honors will charge, or refuse to charge, accordingly as you may find that the old Government has sovereignty and has attempted to exercise it, and that there has been no severance of our territory to the extent of a permanent division,--whether these men are citizens of the United States, or of a foreign country. If they are held to be citizens of a foreign country, to wit, of South Carolina, or of the Confederate States, then they fall back under the eighth section of the Act, as having committed piracy under that section. But, to come back to the attitude of our Government, which this Court must follow, towards these rebels,--towards these malcontents,--towards these combinations, which are exercising the processes of war, undoubtedly,--what is the attitude of our Government? Does it recognize their right--does it recognize their independence--does it recognize their authority, so that you find that our Government has adopted the policy of not punishing them under the laws of the United States?