here. Now, I ask, has the prosecution entitled itself to the benefit of any presumption as to intent? What are the facts--_the conceded facts_? Baker, and a number of persons in Charleston, did openly and notoriously select a vessel called the "Savannah," then lying in the stream, and fitted her out _as a privateer_. Baker, in all of these proceedings, acted under the authority of a commission signed by Jefferson Davis, styling and signing himself President of the Confederate States of America. Baker and his companions then went forth as privateersmen, and in no other capacity, for the purpose of despoiling the commerce of the United States, and _with the strictest injunction not to meddle with the property of any other country_. The instructions were clear and distinct on this head, as you know from having heard them read. They went to sea, and overhauled the Joseph; gave chase with the American flag flying--one of the ordinary devices or cheats practiced in naval warfare; a device frequently adopted by American naval commanders to whose fame no American dare affix the slightest stigma. On nearing the Joseph, the Savannah showed the secession flag, and Baker requested Captain Meyer to come on board with his papers. The Captain asked by what authority, and received for answer: "The authority of the Confederate States." The Captain then went on board with his papers, when Baker, helping him over the side, said: "I am very sorry to take your vessel, but I do so in retaliation against the United States, with whom we are at war." Baker put a prize crew on board the Joseph, and sent her to Georgetown; the Captain he detained there as a prisoner. She was then duly submitted for judgment as a prize. These are the facts upon which they claim that piracy at common law is established. My learned associate, Mr. Larocque, cited a number of cases to show that though a man might take property of another, and appropriate it to his own use, yet if he did so under color of right, under a _bona fide_ impression that he had authority to take the property, he would only be a trespasser; he would have to restore it or pay the value of it, but he could not be convicted of a crime for its conversion. Let me state a case. You own a number of bees. They leave your land, where they hived, and come upon mine, and take refuge in the hollow of a tree, where they deposit their honey. They are your bees, but you cannot come upon my land to take them away; and though they are in my tree, I cannot take the honey. Such a case is reported in our State adjudications. But, suppose that I did take the bees and appropriate the honey to my own use: I might be unjustly _indicted_ for larceny, because I took the property of another, but I am not, consequently, a thief in the eye of the law; the absence of intent to steal would ensure my acquittal.