The same applies if the defendant Gebhardt erroneously assumed a probable consent of the experimental subjects. We do not mean here an erroneous assumption with regard to the legal suppositions of such a one, but the erroneous assumption of such facts, which, had they existed, would have induced the Tribunal to recognize the “probable consent.” I am referring here to my argumentation for the legal excuse represented by the “probable consent,” which I understand as “an objective opinion concerning the law, based on probability and according to which the person concerned would have consented to the act from his own personal standpoint, if he had been fully aware of the circumstances.” Provided that the defendant Dr. Gebhardt assumed the existence of such circumstances which seems certain according to the evidence, and even if he did so erroneously, the intent and thus the crime in this case would also be excluded according to the generally acknowledged principle. * * * * * d. Evidence _Testimony_ Page Extract from the testimony of defendant Mrugowsky 56 Extract from the testimony of prosecution expert witness Dr. 60 Andrew C. Ivy EXTRACT FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT MRUGOWSKY[14] _DIRECT EXAMINATION_ * * * * * DR. FLEMMING: You know that General Taylor, in his opening speech, said that this experiment with aconitine had not been conducted in order to find an antidote to aconitine but in order to ascertain how long it takes to kill a human being in this manner. Please tell the Tribunal whether this concerned an experiment.