Trials of war criminals before the Nuernberg military tribunals under control council law no. 10, volume IIIVarious
History
Trials of war criminals before the Nuernberg military tribunals under control council law no. 10, volume III
Various
Nuremberg Trial of Major German War Criminals, Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946; War crime trials -- Germany -- Nuremberg
In reliance upon the decrees “legalizing” nullification and retrial of
criminal cases at the prosecution’s behest, defendants were deprived of
any assurance that a sentence of less than death was their final fate.
Ministry of Justice officials, working through the prosecution, joined
in this infliction of double jeopardy. For example, in a case involving
a non-German, the defendant Klemm wrote to the president and attorney
general of the Stuttgart District Court of Appeals on 5 July 1944 and
directed the following (_NG-676, Pros. Ex. 178_):
“For some time now, the jurisdiction of the penal senate of
the district court of appeals in Stuttgart has given me cause
for grave thoughts with regard to matters of defeatism. In the
majority of cases, the sentences are considered too mild * * *
and are in an incompatible disproportion to the sentences which
are in similar cases passed by the People’s Court and by other
district courts of appeal. I refer especially to the following
sentences which lately attracted my attention:
“1. Criminal case against Friedrich Linder, sentence of the
Second Penal Senate of 7 January 1944 (President of the Senate,
Dr. Kiefer) * * *. You made a report under date 28 April 1944
on this case regarding the sentence. In view of the danger and
of the frequency of the statements made by the defendant, I
must maintain the interpretation already expressed in my decree
of 15 March 1944, IV Secret I 5045B/44 that the defendant, a
foreigner, deserved a serious sentence of penal servitude. I
have therefore directed the files to the chief Reich prosecutor
at the People’s Court to examine the question whether the
extraordinary appeal should not be applied against the sentence
* * *.”[55]
It is technically true that an extraordinary appeal or plea of nullity
could, on the face of the enabling decrees, operate to a defendant’s
benefit as well as to his detriment; but this possibility was illusory
in practice. Dr. Josef Grueb, former judge of the Nuernberg District
Court of Appeals, says (_NG-672, Pros. Ex. 179_):
“It was obvious that the Ministry of Justice only admitted a
petition for nullity when it was unfavorable to the defendant.
Cases in which the Ministry ordered a nullity plea unfavorable
to the defendant were, at any rate, much more numerous than
cases where the petition for nullity was demanded for the
benefit of the defendant on the Ministry’s own initiative.
* * * It was mainly a means employed by the State to cancel
sentences which seemed inadequate in the light of the political
conceptions of those times.”
A terrifying glimpse of the actual extent to which double jeopardy was
exploited during the Third Reich’s last years, is furnished by the
defendant Nebelung (_NG-333, Pros. Ex. 177_).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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