Trials of war criminals before the Nuernberg military tribunals under control council law no. 10, volume IIIVarious
History
Trials of war criminals before the Nuernberg military tribunals under control council law no. 10, volume III
Various
Nuremberg Trial of Major German War Criminals, Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946; War crime trials -- Germany -- Nuremberg
only now it becomes understandable what authority Anschuetz’ opinion
carried, which was concurred in by all German constitutional lawyers,
that there were no limits for article 76, concerning the amendment
of the constitution. Anschuetz stated repeatedly that the Reichstag,
with the majority that can amend the constitution, could abolish the
republic, the federal state, democracy, even basic laws. No judge
was entitled to doubt the constitutional validity of such a law. If
previously I said that concerning that law of 24 March, one might have
legal misgivings, I had something different in mind. I believe if I
had been the President of the Reich, and if I had had the knowledge of
the events, I would have refused to issue that law and to promulgate
it, for it is the Reich President who has to examine whether the law
has come about in a constitutional manner. I am convinced, however,
that on no account procedures can be constitutional when the majority
present, that is, the majority which passes the resolution, did not
constitute the majority of the Reichstag as elected [by the people]
but constituted the majority of a Reichstag that had been curtailed by
the executive. Much has been said about that, and there is something
else that enters into that question, and I have to say that quite
openly that has not been discussed before. At that session at which
the Reichstag passed that law which changed the constitution, the
Reich Chancellor felt that the Reichstag might make difficulties, and
he threatened with revolutionary forces; but even that doesn’t help
and, particularly, it doesn’t help according to Anschuetz. Anschuetz
and [other] German experts on constitutional law consistently upheld
the view that the assurance of the Reich President, given by his
signature, that the law had been passed in an orderly manner excluded
all scrutiny. Therefore, we have to say, under objective law there may
be misgivings, serious misgivings about that procedure, but according
to what at the time was the guaranteed practice of constitutional law
which was upheld by the opinion of the most fanatic upholders of the
Weimar constitution, the signature by the Reich President excluded
any scrutiny as to whether the law came about in an orderly manner. I
believe that I have now indicated that the question for the so-called
legality of the change-over, even purely formal, is very difficult to
answer, but for the rest it seems to me that this is only an argument
about words; [actually, it was] a revolution, and it was meant to be a
revolution. Hitler even thought it was the only real revolution. And
according to its aim and meaning it [i.e., a revolution] cannot be
legal; but in any case, if it comes off--that is how it always will be
in the world of states--it provides the soil on which the new order,
slowly or more quickly, evolves, according to custom, and custom after
all is the source of all law.
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