“The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in the judgments in Case No. 1 that invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, atrocities or inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding on the tribunals established hereunder and shall not be questioned except insofar as the participation therein or knowledge thereof by any particular person may be concerned. Statements of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. 1 constitute proof of the facts stated, in the absence of substantial new evidence to the contrary.” This provision is couched in language calculated to adequately safeguard the rights of defendants, so that, by the same reasoning, it cannot be said to operate as an oppressive rule, which in any material manner unduly restricts this Court in making its own ultimate determination as to the guilt or innocence of these defendants. It is a reasonable rule designed to avoid undue repetitious production of acknowledged facts in the trial of this cause. As such it does not detract from the dignity of this Court nor affect the concurrent nature of the jurisdiction which this Court enjoys in relation to the International Military Tribunal. In conclusion, therefore, we take the position that this Tribunal, like the International Military Tribunal, derives from the “joint decision” of the signers of the Moscow Declaration and of the French nation; that the subject matter over which it has jurisdiction, the crimes which it has jurisdiction to try, are codified by the same powers, and that it has jurisdiction over the same persons, those persons who are charged by indictment with having committed these crimes. These are the basic elements upon which concurrent jurisdiction as a matter of law has always been determined to exist by all courts which have had occasion to decide this question. We have belabored this question of the equal dignity and concurrent jurisdiction of this Tribunal with that of the International Military Tribunal for reasons which are legal and also arise from the standpoint of policy. To us they seem important and because they do, a due regard for the candor owed to this Tribunal and to the world obligates us to state them.