MR. LAFOLLETTE: 365. This mimeograph may not be completely correct. I am sure that’s right. Otherwise, if that should not be correct I will advise the Court. The overt acts are evidence under counts two and three of this indictment not only of the intent with which the preceding acts were done, but also of the fact that each of those defendants who knew that the preceding acts were being performed--and it is legally inconceivable to believe that they did not know--had knowledge of the fact that there was probable danger that the preceding acts would result in the overt crimes or that the preceding acts, being unlawful _eo ipso_ and therefore felonious, would result in the overt acts as the natural consequence of preceding felonious acts. This is murder--whenever a homicide resulted from the foregoing act. And the murder being “an act usually done pursuant to” the “previous scheme and plans” establishes the guilty intent of each and all of the defendants to commit that murder who stood in any of the relationships to the murder defined in paragraph 2, article II of Law No. 10. We have also said that it is an inevitable result of the murder of hundreds of thousands and millions of humans that such mass murder dulls our realization that the basic simple principles of the law which define the crime of murder of a single human furnish the standard by which was determined the guilt of those who have murdered those humans. A review of these basic rules is therefore proper. In 1877 Mr. Justice Stephen undertook to restate the English common law of homicide as he then found it. He states that an unlawful homicide, without adequate provocation, was murder, if it followed from an act accompanied by one of the following states of mind: (1) an intention to cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to any person; (2) knowledge that the act will probably cause either of the results, even though the actor hopes that they might not occur or is indifferent about them; or (3) an intention to commit a felony or to resist a peace officer in the execution of his duty. As to the first category, no one can quarrel and there is evidence to support the commission of such murders by individual defendants. As to the second category, Mr. Justice Holmes thought that the actor’s awareness of the danger was immaterial, that the standard was completely objective. In Comm. _vs._ Pierce (1884) 138 Mass. 165, page 178, he stated his view succinctly-- “When the jury are asked whether a stick of a certain size was a deadly weapon they are not further asked whether the defendant knew it was so.” /#