These are but the most apparent applications of the three categories of murder to the evidence in this case. Time will not permit our further exemplifying them now. They will be presented adequately when we summarize the evidence. We do not wish to be understood by furnishing these few examples as having exhausted the cases, where the application of the principles so readily understood when one life is taken by murderous homicide, to the evidence of this case, will establish murders and mass murders by these defendants. Furthermore, other crimes common to the criminal laws of civilized nations, such as enslavement, kidnapping, or mayhem, have been committed by these defendants, which can be established by the application of similar basic principles to the evidence, which should make the task more simple and at the same time, by reducing the seeming complexities of mass criminality under international law to concepts with which the average citizen of a nation is acquainted, seem to serve the salutary purpose of increasing the hatred of the average man for war and to warn him of the dangers inherent in the totalitarian police state, dominated by the philosophy that the end justifies the means used to attain it. The crimes charged in count two and in count three fall generally into several categories. Substantively, there are first those war crimes which arise out of the violation of the laws and customs of war, including section I, articles 4–7; section II, article 23; section III, articles 43, 45, 46, and 50 of the Hague Regulations of 1907; and chapter 6, title I, articles 2–4 of the Prisoners of War Convention (Geneva 1929); and the decision and judgment of the IMT of 30 September and 1 October 1946. These defendants, in one or more of the relationships set out in paragraph 2 of article II of Law No. 10, committed numerous criminal acts as defined in Law No. 10, article II. These include, as the first substantive group of crimes, the wrongful extension of German law and German courts into and over the Eastern Territories and other overrun nations and the Protectorate, each of which, we contend, was not only an act done by these defendants in connection with, and in furtherance of, aggressive war, but also done by them for purely political reasons which made no pretense of being based upon military necessity, so that it was _ipso facto_ unlawful or _malum per se_ and made every act initiated thereafter under such wrongful extension, as against any of the defendants who are responsible under Law No. 10, article II, for that wrongful extension of German law, fall into the category of a felony, murder, or a criminal enslavement, mayhem, or atrocity; or a larceny while armed, or a robbery as to plunder of public or private property.