Not all Germans were dazzled by the Oriental glamor of the Bagdad Railway plan. Herr Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democrats in the Reichstag, time and time again sounded warnings against the complications almost certain to result from the construction of the railway. Speaking before the Reichstag in March, 1911, for example, he said: “We are the last to misjudge the great value of this road to civilization. We know its economic significance: we know that it traverses a region which in antiquity was a fabulously fertile country, and we welcome it as a great achievement if the Bagdad Railway opens up that territory. And if, by gigantic irrigation projects, the land can be made into a granary for Europe, as well as a land to which we could look for an abundant supply of raw materials, such as cotton, that would be doubly welcome.” But that is not all, continued Herr Scheidemann. German capitalists would not be able to overlook the military-strategic interests of the line, for only the establishment of a strong centralized government in Turkey “can offer European capitalism the necessary security for the realization of its great capitalistic plans.” This military strengthening of Turkey would be almost certain, he pointed out, to arouse the opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and France. Particularly was he desirous of avoiding any additionally irritating relations with Great Britain, for the traditional friendship with that nation had already been seriously compromised by colonial and naval rivalries.[34] Similar warnings were uttered by other Socialists and anti-imperialists. Quite different in character was the objection raised to the Bagdad Railway by a certain type of more conservative German. An aggressive policy in the Near East naturally would have been distasteful to the diplomatists of the old school, who were disposed to adhere to the Bismarckian principles of isolating France on the Continent and avoiding commercial and colonial conflicts overseas. According to their point of view, German ventures in the Ottoman Empire were certain to lead to two complications: first, the support of Austrian imperial ambitions in the Balkans; second, a German attempt to maintain a dominant political position at Constantinople. Under such circumstances, of course, it would not be possible to bring about a divorce of the newly married France and Russia, for Russian interests in the Near East would brook no compromise on the part of the Tsar’s Government. In addition, it was feared, the establishment of German ports on the Mediterranean and on the Persian Gulf would strengthen British antipathy to Germany, already augmented by naval and commercial rivalry. The final outcome of such a situation undoubtedly would be the formation of a Franco-British-Russian coalition against the Central Powers.