French bankers were disposed to look at the Bagdad enterprise in much the same light. The economic renaissance of Turkey, which it was hoped would be an effect of improved rail communications, would increase the value of their earlier investments in that country. But, in addition, the Bagdad Railway offered handsome profits in itself: profits of promoting the enterprise and floating the various bond issues; profits of the construction company, in which French capital was to participate; profits of the shareholders when the Railway should become a going concern. True, the Council of Ministers had requested the Bourse to outlaw the Bagdad securities. But, after all, when profits are at stake, what is a mere resolution of the Cabinet among friends? A syndicate of French financiers invested heavily in the bonds and stock of the Bagdad Railway Company, the hostility of their Government notwithstanding. And it was said that one of the bankers who participated in the syndicate was none other than M. Rouvier, Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of M. Combes, and subsequently Prime Minister.[35] Many intelligent French students of foreign affairs felt that a merely obstructionist policy on the part of France toward the Bagdad Railway would be futile and, in the end, disastrous. In spite of the many historical and sentimental attachments of France in the Near East, she really had no vital interests which were jeopardized by the Bagdad enterprise. It was urged, therefore, that she should play the rôle of conciliator of the divergent interests of Russia, Great Britain, Germany, and Turkey. A forward-looking program, it was suggested, would be to urge these nations to reach a full and equitable agreement in the promotion of “a project unquestionably valuable in the progress of the whole human race.” National material interests should be merged in “the superior interests of civilization.” Mere self-interest demanded this of France, because, should a war break out over the Near Eastern question, France would most certainly become involved.[36] As regards the claims of Russia to influence French policy in the Bagdad Railway affair, there was a considerable amount of irritability exhibited by French publicists. It was pointed out, for example, that M. Witte was unwilling to accept “internationalization” of the Railway at a time when the German and French bankers were prepared to effect a satisfactory settlement on that basis. It was asserted, also, that Russian strategic interests were adequately safeguarded when the northern route was abandoned by the Black Sea Basin Agreement of 1900. So far from decreased difficulties of Turkish mobilization constituting a menace to Russia, “Russia still had both the power and, apparently, the inclination to be a formidable menace to Turkey.”[37] How could the Colossus of the Caucasus tremble before the Sick Man!