[11] The British banking houses interested in the Bagdad enterprise were Baring Brothers, Sir Ernest Cassel, and Morgan-Grenfell Company. _Cf._ _The Westminster Gazette_, April 24, 1903; _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 260 (1910), p. 2181d. The bankers, of course, were not bound by the decision of the Cabinet to withdraw from the negotiations; they still would have been at liberty to invest in Bagdad Railway securities, as did the French bankers. However, it has been the practice of British financiers to accept the “advice” of the Foreign Office in the case of loans which may lead to international complications. An analogous case in American experience was the decision of prominent New York financial institutions to withdraw from the Chinese consortium in 1913 because of the avowed opposition of President Wilson to the terms of the loan contract. [12] _The Nineteenth Century_, Volume 65 (1909), pp. 1090–1091. [13] _Supra_, pp. 30, 59–60. [14] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 120, pp. 1360–1361; Volume 126, p. 108. The opinions of Mr. Gibson Bowles were not cordially received by _The Scotsman_, which said, April 9, 1903, “Mr. Gibson Bowles carried the House in imagination to the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris. Germany is there seeking by means of a railway to supersede our trade, and to serve herself heir to the wealth and empire of ancient Babylon and Assyria. The member for King’s Lynn was, as usual, not very well posted up on his facts. On this occasion he was so entirely wrong-headed that no one on the opposition bench would agree with him.... The outstanding moral of the debate was, indeed, that the honorable member for King’s Lynn was much in want of a holiday.”