It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the secret treaties
with the pronouncements of Allied statesmen regarding the origins
and purposes of the Great War. Certainly they were no part of the
American program for peace, which promised to “the Turkish portions
of the Ottoman Empire a secure sovereignty”; which demanded “a free,
open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial
claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the government whose title is to be determined”; and which announced
in no uncertain terms that “the day of conquest and aggrandizement is
gone by” as is also “the day of secret covenants entered into in the
interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for
moment to upset the peace of the world.”[29]
Allied diplomacy was to have its way in the Near East, however, for the
goddess of victory finally smiled upon the Allied armies and frowned
upon both Turks and Germans. As 1916 had been a year of Turco-German
triumphs at the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia, 1917 brought
conspicuous Allied victories along the Tigris and in Syria, and 1918
saw the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire. On February 24, 1917,
General Sir Stanley Maude, in command of reënforced and rejuvenated
British forces in Mesopotamia, captured Kut-el-Amara, retrieving the
disaster which had befallen Townshend’s army a year before. Deprived
of the services of Field Marshal von der Goltz, who died during the
Caucasus campaign, the Turks retired in disorder, and on March 11
British troops entered Bagdad—the ancient city which had bulked so
large in the German scheme of things in the Near East. Although the
capture of Bagdad was not in itself of great strategic importance,
its effect on morale in the belligerent countries was considerable.
British imperialists were in possession of the ancient capital of the
Arabian Caliphs, as well as the chief entrepôt of caravan trade in the
Middle East; therefore their prestige with both Arabs and Turks was
certain to rise. At home, pictures of British troops in the Bagdad of
the Arabian Nights appealed to the imagination of the war-weary, as
well as the optimistic, patriot. In the Central Powers, on the other
hand, the loss of Bagdad created scepticism as to whether the German
dream of “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” was not now beyond realization.
This scepticism became more confirmed when, on April 24, General Maude
captured Samarra, northern railhead of the uncompleted Bagdad line in
Mesopotamia.[30]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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