In these circumstances, it was to be expected that the British and
the Turks should seek to effect an understanding. The claims of Great
Britain, it appeared, were more easily reconcilable with the Turkish
program than were the claims of France. Concessions obtained by British
nationals between 1910 and 1914 were largely in areas detached from
Turkey during the War—chiefly in Mesopotamia—whereas many of the most
important French concessions were in Anatolia, the stronghold of the
Turkish Nationalists.[29] To Great Britain, therefore, it was a matter
of comparative indifference whether all concessions within Turkey
were specifically confirmed; to France it was a matter of the utmost
importance. According to the proposed Lausanne treaty the Turkish
Government was to expropriate the former German railways in Turkey,
with a view to incorporating them into a state-owned system, and was to
pay therefor to the Financial Commission, on reparations account, a sum
to be fixed by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations.[30] It
suited British interests thus to prevent a rival Power from obtaining
control of the former Bagdad line; it suited French interests not
at all to be deprived of a considerable share in a highly important
enterprise. In the settlement of questions regarding the Ottoman Public
Debt, likewise, the French were more obdurate than the British.
In the closing days of the conference, the question of Mosul and its
oilfields—the last question which stood in the way of an Anglo-Turkish
agreement—was temporarily settled by a decision to make it the subject
of “direct and friendly negotiations between the two interested
Powers.” But no agreement was possible between Turkey and France on
concessions and capitulations. When the first Lausanne Conference broke
up, therefore, it was because of the determination of the Turks not to
accept economic, financial, and judicial clauses which they believed
menaced their independence. “The treaty,” said Ismet Pasha, head of
the Turkish delegation, “would strangle Turkey economically. I refuse
to accept economic slavery for my country, and the demands of the
Allies remove all possibility of economic rehabilitation and kill all
our hopes.” On the other hand, the refusal of the Turks to sign was
characterized by the chief of the French delegates as “a crime.”[31]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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