At the same time, however, less cordial sentiments were expressed toward Russia and France. There was general agreement among the London newspapers regarding at least one desirable feature of the Bagdad Railway enterprise: the discomfiture it would be certain to cause the Tsar in his imperial ambitions in the Near East. _The Globe_ characterized as “impudence” the desire of Russia to regard Asiatic Turkey as “a second Manchuria.”[22] No love was being lost, either, on France. _The Daily Mail_ of November 9, 1899, said: “The French have succeeded in wholly convincing John Bull that they are his inveterate enemies. England has long hesitated between France and Germany. But she has always respected German character, while she has gradually come to feel scorn for France. Nothing in the nature of an _entente cordiale_ can exist between England and her nearest neighbor. France has neither courage nor political sense.” THE BAGDAD RAILWAY CONCESSION IS GRANTED It was almost three years after the Sultan’s preliminary announcement of the Bagdad concession that the imperial decree was issued. During the interval the German technical commission was completing its survey of the line; details of the concession were being arranged between Zihni Pasha, Minister of Public Works, and Dr. Kurt Zander, General Manager of the Anatolian Railway Company; Dr. von Siemens was working out plans for the financing of the enterprise. Finally, on March 18, 1902, an imperial _iradé_ of Abdul Hamid II definitely awarded the Bagdad Railway concession to the Anatolian Railway Company.[23] The Constantinople despatches announcing the Sultan’s award met with a varied reception. In Germany, of course, there was general satisfaction and, in some quarters, jubilation. The Kaiser telegraphed his personal thanks to the Sultan. In Vienna, the semi-official _Fremdenblatt_ expressed the opinion that “the construction of the railway would be an event of the greatest economic and political importance and would materially strengthen Turkey’s power of resistance.”[24] M. Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, interpolated in the Chamber, informed the Deputies that, whether one liked it or not, the convention was a _fait accompli_ which France must accept, particularly because French capitalists were associated with the German concessionaires in the enterprise.[25] The Russian Government was silent at the time, although two months before M. Witte had informed the press that he saw no reason for granting financial assistance or diplomatic acquiescence to a possible competitor of Russian trans-Asiatic railways.[26]