The distinction between Art Criticism and Aesthetic--The aim of this chapter--Art and physical fact--The ‘common-sense’ conception of landscape art as evidence of fact--The relation of Art and Nature--Mr. Ruskin’s treatment of this subject--He distinguishes (a) physical fact and (b) the artist’s thoughts and feelings about these facts, yet maintains that the representation of (a) is equivalent to the expression of (b)--His confusion of Nature and Mind exemplified in his remarks on the ‘Pass of Faïdo’--Art as the organ of Beauty implies that the dualism of Nature and Mind is transcended--Nature is neither given nor immediate--Art therefore cannot copy nature--What does art represent?--An individualised psychical content present to the mind of the artist--Classification of Turner’s sketches and studies from the point of view of their logical content--The difference between (1) Studies of particular objects, (2) Drawings from nature, and (3) Works of art proper--The logical reference of a work of art--The assertions in a work of art do not directly qualify the ordinary world of reality, but an imaginary world specially constructed for the artist’s purpose--The ideal of complete definition--Yet the content must determine the form--Plea for a dynamic or physiological study of artistic forms. We have been engaged thus far upon a genuinely inductive investigation, upon a voyage of discovery, and not upon a dogmatic exposition of ultimate aesthetic principles. Our general aim has been to study the processes of artistic expression, but to study them as we find them in definite concrete instances. Moreover, the nature of our subject-matter rendered it necessary to keep faithful to the point of view of art criticism. We were dealing with particular works of art, and to leave them while we plunged into general questions of aesthetic would hardly have been polite. But, as I have ventured to observe before, though art criticism and general aesthetic can be distinguished they cannot be rigidly separated. Aesthetic without close conversance with the concrete subject-matter of art criticism is necessarily loose and empty, while art criticism without a firm grasp of the broad principles of beauty easily degenerates into casuistry or a useless and rather despicable form of self-assertion. And however much we try to keep questions of principle apart from our estimation and study of particular works of art, we are bound inevitably to fail. We can begin as it were at either end of the scale, we can busy ourselves with the one or with the many, but before we have gone very far we are bound to realise that we are concerned with exactly the same problems. The distinction of art criticism from aesthetic is merely one of convenience and degree.