Once up there, the weak point was revealed: there was no line of retreat for the Boers, except over open country, where we could have slated them handsomely as they went. I think, all the same, that they should have held this fine ridge all along its length, and eventually withdrawn to a secondary position in rear, which they could have held for any length of time. This secondary position, we found, they were actually occupying in strength, but they neglected the primary position, and thus lost an opportunity, to my mind, of checking our advance for, possibly, another day, and doing us a lot of harm besides. However, the enemy's mistakes are always our gain. Our two companies advanced in column of sections, in widely extended order, with considerable distances between the sections, as we expected to meet a heavy flanking fire going across the valley. As it happened, however, only a dropping fire was opened on us, and we reached the farm unscathed, scattered through it, and stretched away up the hill beyond. A moment's glance sufficed to show that this hill was of no advantage to us, and so we pushed on round it to the left, down the cleft, across the road and up the other side. Nothing was to be seen from here but the gently rising hill, with some rocks on our left front, so we lay down and waited for further orders, as our original instructions to occupy the ridge had been completed. On our right rear we could see the C.I.V.'s still coming over the ridge and disappearing over the rising ground to the right, and, from their movements, we could judge that they were coming under a hot fire as they crossed the heights and came out on the open ground. From what we saw afterwards, this view appeared correct, as the enemy, failing to occupy the ridge itself, had retired to a strong position among rocks quite 1,500 yards to the right front, where, at his leisure and in perfect safety himself, he could slate our troops as they advanced over the open.