Later on the 16th, Craig drove to the front to reconnoiter the area marked for the Brigade jump-off. He visited the 9th RCT command post where Colonel Hill informed him that the Army unit was in good condition as it stood by for the great attack.[282] [282] _Ibid._ _Reconnaissance of Terrain_ After Craig’s reconnaissance, Lieutenant Colonel Murray arrived at the front to discuss the tactical plan with the 9th RCT Commander. Although Colonel Hill spoke confidently of his outfit’s readiness for the attack, Murray observed that the ranks of soldiers on Observation Hill and Hill 125 were dun and the men obviously wearied by the fighting of the previous 5 days.[283] [283] 24th InfDiv Op Instr No. 26 for this period showed the 9th RCT(-) at 47 percent strength and 44 percent estimated combat efficiency. Morale for the consistently hard-hit 24th Division was gauged “Fair.” With this impression in mind, the 5th Marines commander studied the terrain soon to be his regiment’s battleground. Between Observation Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, a 300-yard rice paddy was flanked to the north of the road by the 9th RCT positions on Hill 125. Across the MSR from the northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge was the congested village of Tugok. West of the hamlet and northwest of Brigade Objective One was long, low Finger Ridge, target of Hill’s RCT.[284] [284] _Ibid._ Murray quickly concluded from the terrain that both regiments should not attack together and become exposed simultaneously in the low ground ahead. Since Obong-ni Ridge was closer than the Army objective and dominated both Tugok and Finger Ridge, Murray suggested that the 5th Marines jump off alone at 0800, 17 August. If the 9th RCT would support him by fire from Hill 125, he would cake Obong-ni Ridge and return the courtesy while the Army unit cleared Tugok and seized its objective. And though offering his plan on a tactical basis, Murray also took into consideration the condition and numbers of Hill’s troops.[285] [285] _Ibid._ The 9th RCT commander agreed, and the responsibility of delivering the first punch lay with the 5th Marines.[286] [286] _Ibid._ Time and chance were against the Brigade throughout 16 August and the following morning. Banking on the use of 145 Army trucks, Craig and Murray hoped to move quickly on the 16th, in order to have one infantry battalion take over Observation Hill and the other two available for the attack on the 17th. Unfortunately, only 43 trucks were actually provided, with the result that time schedules were thrown off and troops forced to march long distances the night before the attack.[287] [287] Brig SAR, basic rpt; Annex How; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.