After he and his officers had been assigned rooms in a temporary barracks, Craig requested permission to reconnoiter the combat zone.[102] Walker assented, providing his own plane and pilot for the trip. Accompanied by Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, his G-4, Craig flew first to Pusan, where he checked harbor facilities, roads, and railways. There he conferred with Brigadier General Crump Garvin, USA, to initiate preparations for the Brigade’s arrival.[103] [102] The _combat zone_ comprises that part of the theater of operations required for the conduct of war by field forces. In this case it included all of Korea remaining in UN hands. [103] Craig, 25 Jan 54. Leaving Pusan, the Marine officers flew over Chinhae, which they discovered to be a suitable base, if necessary, for VMO-6 and the Brigade’s air support control unit. Cruising westward, they passed over Masan, then continued toward Chinju. From the latter vicinity, the enemy’s envelopment was then threatening the western approaches to Pusan. Veering northward, the reconnaissance party paralleled the Naktong River. The pilot, who was familiar with the ground, briefed his passengers along the way. By the time the plane returned to Taegu, the Marines had a broad picture of the critical areas most likely to become Brigade battlefields.[104] [104] _Ibid._ General Craig and his ground officers remained at Taegu 4 days. Attending daily briefings of the Eighth Army staff, they acquired a sound knowledge of the tactical situation. At a conference with Major General Earle E. Partridge and his Fifth Air Force staff,[105] the Marines were brought up to date on the disposition of aviation and its policy for supporting UN ground forces.[106] [105] Hq 5th AF was also located at Taegu. [106] Craig, 15 Apr 54. In the fight for time, ground force units in line were frequently withdrawn and shuttled to plug gaps in the sagging front. Reports from the battlefield more often were food for the imagination rather than fact for the planning room. All of this created confusion among Eighth Army staff officers.[107] [107] _Ibid._; and Stewart, 15 Jan 54. In the Taejon area the 24th Infantry Division had lost 770 officers and men during the single week of 15–22 July. Of these casualties, 61 were known dead, 203 wounded, and 506 missing in action.[108] Among the missing was General Dean, and the wounded included a regimental commanding officer, a regimental executive officer, and a battalion commander.[109] [108] 24th InfDiv Periodic Personnel Rpt No. 2, 15–22 Jul 50. [109] _Ibid._ Following this ordeal, the 24th had been relieved by the recently arrived 1st Cavalry Division, which went into line alongside the 25th Division in the Kumchon area. ROK divisions held to the north and east, where NKPA forces were driving toward Pohang-dong.