U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 1 (of 5): The Pusan PerimeterMontross, Lynn
History
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 1 (of 5): The Pusan Perimeter
Montross, Lynn
Korean War, 1950-1953 -- Campaigns; United States. Marine Corps -- History -- Korean War, 1950-1953
The shape of strategic things to come was indicated late in July when
two NKPA divisions completed a much publicized “end run” past the open
UN left flank to the southwest tip of the peninsula, then wheeled
eastward for a drive on Pusan.
General Walker reacted promptly to the danger by recalling the 24th
Division from Eighth Army reserve and moving it southward from Kumchon
to block the enemy near Hadong. With the recently landed 29th Infantry
attached, the division totalled only 13,351 officers and men.[110]
Its front extended from the southern coast near Hadong to the town of
Kochang, 40 miles north.[111] In addition to manning this mountainous
line, the 24th had troops in action at Pohang-dong, more than 100 miles
away on the east coast. There some of its units fought as Task Force
Perry, under direct control of Eighth Army headquarters.[112]
[110] _Ibid._, No. 3, 29 Jul 50. Actually, as the report
itself states, this figure is a meaningless statistic,
and exceeds the _real_ total by several hundred. It
was the practice not to subtract missing-in-action
casualties until 30 days after losses were reported.
Also, casualty reports from far-flung subordinate units
were received irregularly, and some of these undoubtedly
were not available when this tally was made.
[111] 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50.
[112] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50.
The 24th Division and 29th Infantry had no more than deployed when they
found themselves plunged into a confused 5-day fight. Although they
sold ground as dearly as possible, the Army units were compelled to
give up Hadong and fall back toward Chinju.[113]
[113] 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50.
As the threat to Pusan grew more serious, the Eighth Army commander
shifted units. In order to protect the approaches from Chinju to Pusan,
he pulled the 25th Infantry Division back across the river Naktong near
Waegwan and moved it from the northern to the southern front in 48
hours. The next day saw the 1st Cavalry withdrawing across the Naktong
in the Waegwan area and blowing the bridges.
After being relieved in the south by the 25th Division, the 24th joined
the 1st Cavalry withdrawal to hastily organized defensive positions
east of the Naktong. ROK divisions continued to defend the northeast
approaches, while the 25th Division stood guard to block any enemy move
toward Chinju.[114]
[114] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50.
At this juncture General Craig became increasingly concerned about
prospects of maintaining the Brigade’s integrity as a Marine air-ground
team. He and his staff were aware that elements of the 29th Infantry
had been rushed from their ships directly into combat in the Chinju
area, and some units were badly mauled. Craig took occasion, therefore,
to remind Army leaders once more of the Marine tactical concept of the
indivisible air-ground team.[115]
[115] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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