MAG-33, said Craig, would have to unload its planes and prepare them for action; and the control squadron would need an interval to set up co-ordinated tactical air support.[116] [116] _Ibid._; and Craig, 15 Apr 54. _Crisis of Eighth Army_ As July drew to an end, the situation both on the northern and southwestern fronts was developing into a crisis. Hourly it grew apparent that the Eighth Army’s perimeter would have to shrink even more, so that defenses could assume some depth in sensitive areas. Landrum indicated for the first time that the Brigade was being considered primarily for a mission on the left flank.[117] Guided by this possibility, Craig and his staff officers devoted a day to drawing up a flexible operation plan. The purpose of this directive was to advise the Brigade’s subordinate commanders of possible commitment in the Chinju, Kochang, or Kumchon areas, in that order of probability. Also included were detailed instructions for movement to forward assembly areas, broad missions for supporting units, security measures to be taken, and a general outline of the situation ashore.[118] [117] Craig, 25 Jan 54. [118] Brig Op Plan No. 3-50, 31 Jul 50; Craig, 25 Jan 54. The “Kochan” and “Kumwan” referred to in the operations plan are actually Kochang and Kumchon. The odd assortment of maps available in the early days of the war offered a variety of spelling along with far more serious inaccuracies. [Illustration: 8th ARMY SITUATION LATE JULY 1950] The advance party extracted from the plan a fragmentary warning order suitable for radio transmission. This message was delivered to Eighth Army headquarters with a request that it be sent immediately to the Brigade at sea.[119] Now Craig assumed that Snedeker and Murray would have a reasonable impression of the situation awaiting them.[120] [119] Stewart, 15 Jan 54. [120] _Ibid._ At an Army briefing on the 29th, the Marines learned that the UN left flank was collapsing. An air of uneasiness pervaded Taegu, and Eighth Army headquarters began preparations for displacement to Pusan. Craig was told that the Brigade definitely would be committed in the southwest, unless a more critical situation suddenly sprang up elsewhere. Again the Army officers added that the Marine unit actually must be prepared to move in any direction on short notice.[121] [121] Craig, 25 Jan 54 and 17 Apr 54. With the approval of the Eighth Army, the Brigade commander immediately sent a message to COMNAVFE requesting that the Marine air group be made available to support the ground force by 2 August, and that VMO-6 be transported to Korea as quickly as possible.[122] Time was drawing short. [122] _Ibid._