While the 2 Red bases were erupting in smoke and flame, 2 other pilots of the squadron flew from the _Sicily_ to Taegu to be briefed on the broad tactical situation. They returned from their visit with maps and intelligence material for guidance in future operations.[159] [159] _Ibid._ The squadron flew 21 sorties on 4 August against enemy bases controlling the pressure on Eighth Army’s southern flank. Racing in from the sea, gull-winged Marine planes struck at bridges, railroads, and troop concentrations in the Chinju and Sachon areas. On 5 August, the _Sicily_ steamed into the Yellow Sea. Marine planes descended on Inchon, Seoul, and Mokpo, battering airfields, factories, warehouses, railroads, bridges, and harbor facilities. The same pattern of destruction was repeated the following day.[160] [160] _Ibid._ On 6 August came a thundering bid for fame by VMF-323, as its sleek Corsairs streaked toward Korea. Operating from the deck of the _Badoeng Strait_, the squadron flew 30 sorties in deep support forward of Eighth Army lines. Carrying the mail with 500-pound bombs, 20-mm. cannon and 5-inch rockets, Marine pilots struck at Communist troop concentrations, vehicles, supply dumps, bridges and railroads.[161] [161] VMF-323 SAR, _op. cit._ _Planning the Sachon-Chinju Offensive_ As early as 3 August, during the Brigade move from Pusan to Changwon, General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had flown by helicopter to Masan for a conference of troop commanders. There they joined General Walker and General Kean at the latter’s 25th Division command post. Also present was Brigadier General George B. Barth, artillery officer of the 25th.[162] [162] Craig, 25 Jan 54. Craig suggested to the Eighth Army commander that some ROK army trainees be attached to the Brigade. There were thousands of such Korean recruits, and a few serving as scouts, interpreters, and rear-area guards would be of great value to the Marines. Walker agreed to provide the native troops and arm them as well.[163] [163] _Ibid._ The Army leader confirmed the previous night’s telephonic orders which had caused the Brigade’s move to Changwon. After the four generals had discussed the tactical situation on the southern flank, Walker directed Craig to have the Brigade prepared for commitment to combat any time after the evening of 5 August.[164] [164] _Ibid._ This schedule worked out perfectly from Craig’s point of view. The Air Support Section at Chinhae had just established communications with the two carrier-based squadrons. Army-Navy-Marine co-operation thus enabled the Brigade commander to lead his entire air-ground team into battle.